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RETURNING TO THE STATUTORY TEXT: WHY
THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 13(B) REQUIRES
COURTS TO NARROWLY CONSTRUE THE FTC’S
ABILITY TO OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Christopher Halm*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the
areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to
support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other
features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district
court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of
those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a
permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing
injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending
violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This
is known as the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.
Recently, the Third Circuit’s holding in FTC v. Shire Viropharma,
Inc. potentially upends the longstanding dominance of that
permissive judicial interpretation. Shire found that the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard was incompatible with the statutory text of
Section 13(b). In particular, the court found that the phrase “about to
violate” sets a benchmark for seeking injunctive relief that is higher
than the “likelihood of recurrence” standard. In other words, for the
FTC to seek injunctive relief, the alleged violation needs to truly be
about to occur rather than merely likely to occur.
An examination of the plain meaning and congressional intent,
which can be discerned from the legislative history, of Section 13(b)
shows that the statute does indeed set a standard for awarding
injunctive relief that is higher than the “likelihood of recurrence”
standard. Namely, Section 13(b) requires that future violations be
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imminent or impending–not merely likely–for injunctive relief to be
granted. Since the “likelihood of recurrence” test does not comport
with the plain meaning or congressional intent of the statute, courts
should no longer use it when determining if a defendant is “about to
violate” the law. Instead, courts should undertake an analysis that is
true to the text, and carefully and properly consider whether future
violations are genuinely about to occur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—founded over a hundred
years ago during the Progressive Era—was once largely toothless.1 That
began to change in the 1970s when the bipartisan agency was given
greater authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)
to enforce its findings by obtaining injunctive relief for consumers in
1.

See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
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federal court.2 That authority—codified in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act
(“Section 13(b)”)—states that
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any person,
partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any
provision of law enforced by the [FTC] . . . the Commission by any
of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a
district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.3

The statutory language “is violating, or is about to violate” has
recently come under increased scrutiny.4 For decades, the broad judicial
construction of the phrase “about to violate” has greatly expanded the
scope of Section 13(b) and the ability of the FTC to employ the courts to
enforce consumer protections.5 Recently, however, the Third Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s expansive construction of the statute, which
had found that “likelihood of recurrence” satisfies the statute’s “about to
violate” standard.6
Like the Third Circuit, this Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation is unsupported by the text and congressional intent of
Section 13(b). Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to resolve this
split. If it follows the Third Circuit’s narrow construction of the statute,
the circumstances under which the FTC can seek injunctive relief from
district courts will be significantly reduced. Namely, the FTC may be
unable to seek injunctive relief against defendants whose violations have
ceased but are still likely to recur.
Part II of this Note examines the history of Section 13(b) and how
the “likelihood of recurrence” test became the judicial default. Part III
examines recent caselaw that challenges the predominance of the
“likelihood of recurrence” test. Part IV argues that, in determining
whether to grant injunctive relief against a defendant, the “likelihood of
recurrence” test is unfaithful to the statutory text and congressional
intent of Section 13(b).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
See discussion infra Part III.
Specifically, its ability to pursue past violations. See discussion infra Section

II.B.2.
6. Compare FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2019),
with FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
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II. SECTION 13(B) AND THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE”
STANDARD
In response to concerns about the adequacy of the FTC’s
enforcement mechanisms, the 93rd Congress amended the FTC Act to
add Section 13(b).7 Section 13(b) grants the FTC the ability to seek
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent
injunctions in district court, so long as the defendant “is violating” or “is
about to violate” any of the laws enforced by the agency.8 When the
FTC began using Section 13(b), many courts grappled with how to
determine whether the FTC had met its initial burden of showing that
the defendant is “about to violate” the law.9 Specifically, in cases where
a defendant had previously violated the law and the FTC alleged that it
was about to violate the law again, courts increasingly began to use the
“likelihood of recurrence” test.10 Under this standard, so long as the FTC
demonstrates that a past violation is “likely to recur,” the court will find
that the FTC has met its burden of showing that the defendant is “about
to violate” the law.11
Section II.A introduces the historical background and legislative
history that gave rise to Section 13(b). Section II.B then examines the
caselaw that led to the near-universal use of the “likelihood of
recurrence” test in cases where the FTC is alleging that a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.
A. THE CREATION OF SECTION 13(B)
As the administrative state grew dramatically in the 1970s, weak
enforcement mechanisms constrained the FTC and commentators
criticized the agency for its correspondingly lackluster efforts to protect
7.
8.

See discussion infra Section II.A.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b). Note that the language of Section
13(b) encompasses only ongoing or future violations (“is violating or is about to
violate”), not past violations. See also AMG Cap. Mgmt. v. FTC, No. 19-508, 2021
U.S. LEXIS 2108, at *1348 (Apr. 22, 2021). Nonetheless, the FTC often pursues past
violations under Section 13(b) anyway, with great success, by alleging that the past
violator “is about to violate” the law again and must be enjoined. See discussion infra
Section II.B.2.
9. See discussion infra Section II.B.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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consumers.12 For decades, the FTC had been limited to enforcing its
laws through a process known as administrative adjudication.13
Unfortunately, this wholly-internal process was slow, burdensome, and
did little to remedy illegal conduct.14
1. The Historical Basis for Section 13(b)
When the FTC was founded in the early 1900s, lawmakers were
mainly concerned with the rise of monopolies, cartels, and other anticompetitive actors.15 In response, Congress passed the FTC Act, which
prohibited anti-competitive conduct and tasked the FTC with policing
such violations.16 A little over twenty years later, an increase in
consumer frauds spurred further expansion of the FTC’s jurisdiction to
cover frauds and deception against consumers.17 To that end, Congress
amended the FTC Act in 1938 to ban “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices,” giving the FTC sole jurisdiction to police such violations. 18
Despite such wide mandates to police anti-competitive conduct and
consumer fraud, Congress only granted the FTC limited remedies to

12. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 66-73 (1969) (describing the cease-and-desist remedy as inadequate and
criticizing FTC enforcement as inconsistent and haphazard).
13. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
14. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591
(1973) (noting that the current system of administrative adjudication hampers the FTC’s
investigative and law enforcement functions); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 62-64 (1969), reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS FOR
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 885, 952-54 (1969) (addressing inadequacy of then-existing
remedies for FTC Act violations).
15. See Woodrow Wilson, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
Additional Legislation for the Control of Trusts and Monopolies (Jan. 20, 1914), H.R.
Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914) (arguing that legislative action needed to be
taken against detrimental monopolies).
16. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. at 719.
17. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
1139, 1157 (1992) (noting the need “to address a national crisis in the advertising and
sale of drugs and devices that could endanger health”).
18. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (amending the
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)).
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carry out these mandates.19 Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, whenever
the FTC uncovered anti-competitive conduct or consumer fraud, the
foremost remedy was to issue “an order requiring such person,
partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method
of competition or such act or practice.”20 The only way to issue this
cease and desist order was for the FTC to initiate litigation through an
internal administrative adjudication process.21 If, at the end of that
adjudication, an administrative law judge found that there were
violations of the law, he could then issue a cease and desist order.22
The problem with this approach was that the internal adjudicative
process was slow and the cease and desist remedy was not a particularly
effective deterrent against violators.23 First, an administrative
adjudication could take years.24 Second, while that process played out,
there was nothing to stop the defendant from continuing to engage in the
anti-competitive or fraudulent conduct.25 For instance, a defendant could
continue its process of acquiring a company even if the FTC was suing
to block the acquisition on antitrust grounds.26 Likewise, a defendant
accused of scamming consumers via false advertisements could continue
to run them up until the moment a final decision was rendered.27 Third,
if a party was ultimately found liable, a cease and desist order was not a
particularly formidable remedy, because the FTC could not seek a

19. Id. at 114-15. The only limited exception, at the time, involved false
advertisements for “food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.” Only in those such cases could
the FTC seek a different remedy: litigation in federal district court.
20. Id. at 112.
21. See, e.g., A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative,
Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/LRB8-G549] (last modified
May 2021).
22. Id.
23. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73.
24. See id. (estimating four years as the average duration of an investigation and
noting that some extend more than twenty years).
25. See id. at 73 (noting that alleged violators can continue their illegal conduct up
until the moment a final cease and desist order is granted).
26. See Letter from Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Rep.
Harold T. Johnson (Nov. 9, 1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,610 (1973)
(explaining how the inability of the FTC to obtain preliminary injunctive relief allows
illegal conduct to continue unabated).
27. See id.
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contempt order if a defendant violated its cease and desist order.28 For a
party engaged in illegal conduct, there was little incentive to not violate
the law because they could continue to act unlawfully even once sued
and, if ultimately found guilty, were simply prohibited from engaging in
that conduct without additional repercussions.29
Overall, the FTC’s ability to enforce its laws was constrained by a
cumbersome administrative adjudication process and weak remedies.30
So, in 1973, the agency turned to Congress for help.31
2. The Legislative History of Section 13(b)
In the early 1970s, the United States faced a dire energy crisis.32
U.S. oil production was in a steep decline and fraying international
relations spurred many members of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to curtail the amount of oil exported to the
United States.33 In response, Congress hurriedly worked to pass
legislation authorizing the construction of a crucial new domestic oil
pipeline in Alaska.34 This legislation, called the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, was introduced into Congress on March 1, 1973. 35
As the bill worked its way through Congress, Senator Henry Jackson of
Washington, at the behest of the FTC, offered up an amendment that
would increase the agency’s enforcement powers.36 This amendment
would ultimately add Section 13(b) to the FTC Act.37 Specifically, the
28. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 73 (noting the general lack of
concern exhibited by respondents).
29. Id.
30. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 26-27.
32. See Richard Nixon, 37th President, United States of America, Address to the
Nation About Policies to Deal with the Energy Shortages (Nov. 7, 1973),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/255503 [https://perma.cc/36KQ-JHRT].
33. Id.
34. See MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON, H.R. DOC. NO. 187, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-4 (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,620-22 (1973) (detailing Congress’
work to achieve energy self-sufficiency).
35. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591
(1973).
36. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988). See 119
CONG. REC. 22,980 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (explaining how Section 53(b)
will enable the FTC to seek injunctive relief in federal district courts).
37. See § 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (adding Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988)).
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amendment would empower the FTC to sue, in district court, for a
temporary injunction whenever it had reason to believe that a defendant
was violating or was “about to violate” any of the FTC’s laws. 38
Additionally, the amendment contained a second provision that would
even allow the FTC to seek, in district court, a permanent injunction in
“proper cases . . . after proper proof.”39
The congressional intent of Section 13(b) is best explained by
examining the legislative history.40 A report by the Senate Commerce
Committee (“Commerce Committee Report”) focused on how, even
after the FTC initiates an internal adjudication, the perpetrator can
nonetheless continue to violate the law until a final order is issued.41
That oversight incentivizes defendants to delay the administrative
proceedings as long as possible, since they could freely violate the law
up until the administrative law judge issues a cease and desist order.42 In
light of this, the stated purpose of Section 13(b) was to remove this
constraint and make certain that there would be “prompt enforcement”
of the FTC’s laws.43
This sentiment was echoed during the congressional floor debates.44
Representative Neal Smith of Iowa recognized the acute need to halt
potentially illegal conduct “while the litigation winds its way through
final decision.”45 Representative John Melcher of Montana saw the
legislation as a key tool in removing “procedural roadblocks” and
allowing the FTC to act “in a quick and effective manner” to better
combat illegal conduct.46 Other representatives also noted that, since
Section 13(b) would be preliminarily used to enjoin defendants from
violating the law, there would no longer be an incentive for defendants
to prolong administrative proceedings.47 In sum, members of Congress

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 592.
Id.
See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356).
Id.
§ 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (1973).
See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
119 CONG. REC. 36,609 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
119 CONG. REC. 36,597 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Melcher).
119 CONG. REC. 36,609 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (“The possibility of
injunction should give serious second thoughts to those who plan a quick ‘killing’ and
withdrawal before retribution occurs.”). See also id. at 36,610 (remarks of Rep.
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supported Section 13(b) as a measure that would empower the courts to
both provide greater consumer protections and ease some of the
procedural constraints on the FTC’s enforcement authority.48
There was also much discussion surrounding the portion of Section
13(b) that would authorize the FTC to seek permanent injunctive
relief.49 While many in Congress thought permitting the FTC to seek
preliminary injunctions was a rational, measured response to a
legitimate procedural loophole, allowing the FTC to seek permanent
injunctions—thereby completely bypassing the internal administrative
process altogether—represented a remarkable increase in the FTC’s
enforcement abilities.50 Yet, despite the potential for significantlyincreased injunctive power, the legislative history suggests a more
measured purpose.51 First, as noted in the Commerce Committee Report,
the permanent injunction provision was intended to provide for the
quick disposition of cases involving run-of-the-mill fraud, such as
blatantly deceptive advertisements.52 The Commerce Committee Report
explained how, in such “proper cases” after The FTC proffered “proper
proof,” the district court would be able to dispose of the case by issuing
a permanent injunction—a remedy that is essentially the same as the
cease and desist order that caps the arduous administrative process but
in a much shorter time frame.53 Second, there were concerns from the
judiciary that limiting its role to issuing a preliminary injunction with no
control over the FTC’s subsequent internal administrative adjudication
would reduce its oversight on the case.54 Allowing judges to hear the
entire case and issue a permanent injunction would placate these
concerns by giving district courts total control over the disposition of the
matter.55

Johnson) (explaining how enjoined parties would no longer find it advantageous to
delay FTC proceedings).
48. § 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (“[T]he investigative and law enforcement
responsibilities of the [FTC] have been restricted and hampered because of inadequate
legal authority . . . to seek preliminary injunctive relief . . . .”).
49. See infra notes 50-54.
50. Compare Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), with Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
51. S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356) (explaining the history of
bill).
52. Id. at 30-31.
53. Id. at 44, 52.
54. Id. at 30-31.
55. Id.
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In sum, Section 13(b) revolutionized the FTC’s ability to enforce
its laws.56 At a minimum, the FTC could now ask a court to temporarily
enjoin illegal conduct while the agency’s administrative proceedings
played out.57 Even better, for garden-variety violations, the FTC could
also request a court to permanently enjoin the illegal conduct, a remedy
that was just as good, if not better, than what the FTC previously could
only get at the end of an arduous administrative adjudication.58
B. SECTION 13(B) IN ACTION: THE RISE OF THE “LIKELIHOOD OF
RECURRENCE” STANDARD
This Section will examine the caselaw that developed as the FTC
began using its powers under Section 13(b) to litigate directly in federal
district court. Section II.B.1 explains the FTC’s initial difficulty in
bringing Section 13(b) cases. Section II.B.2 examines how the
“likelihood of recurrence” test became the paramount standard used by
courts when determining if the FTC has shown that a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.
1. A Slow Start and a Constitutional Challenge
After Section 13(b) was passed, the FTC did not exactly rush to
district court to seek injunctions through its newly-delegated authority.59
In fact, five years after Section 13(b) was passed, the General
Accounting Office criticized the FTC for not making better use of its
new Section 13(b) powers.60 Then, in the 1980s, the FTC began to use
its Section 13(b) authority more frequently, especially in consumer fraud
cases.61 These initial actions invited a broad constitutional challenge to

56.
57.
58.

See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
Id. See S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356) (explaining history

of bill).
59. Letter from Gregory J. Ahart, Director, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, to Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, in 889 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-24, F-1 (Nov. 16, 1978).
60. Id. See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL, VICTIMS OF UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
GET LIMITED HELP FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-140, at
23-24 (1978).
61. See, e.g., FTC v. Pharmatech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1983).
See also Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special
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Section 13(b).62 FTC v. American National Cellular challenged the
constitutionality of Section 13(b), claiming that giving the FTC the
ability to seek injunctive relief essentially granted the agency law
enforcement authority in violation of the separation of powers.63 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.64
2. The “Likelihood of Recurrence” Test Emerges
After fending off a challenge to the constitutionality of Section
13(b), the FTC began to use its Section 13(b) authority much more
frequently, especially for consumer protection cases.65 In fact, by the
late 1990s, the FTC was litigating the majority of its consumer fraud
cases in district courts instead of through administrative adjudication.66
As the FTC increasingly asserted its Section 13(b) authority,
conflict arose over the “is violating, or is about to violate” language in
the statute.67 In particular, there was confusion regarding how to
determine whether a defendant is “about to violate” the law.68 The
statute neither defined the word “about” nor explained how to
distinguish a party that merely has the potential to violate the law from a
party that is on the verge of violating the law.69 As a result, courts faced
a dilemma over how to define common words70 and phrases when they
appear in a statute.71 This phenomenon is not unusual; words and
phrases that are easily understood in everyday parlance can quickly

Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43,
78-85 (1989) (Kirkpatrick II) [hereinafter The Kirkpatrick Report].
62. FTC v. Am. Nat’l Cellular, 810 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1514.
65. See The Kirkpatrick Report, supra note 61, at 78-85.
66. See Stephen Calkins, Articles and Comments: An Enforcement Official’s
Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 432 (1997) (“[M]ost FTC
consumer protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court under [Section
13(b)], rather than by means of administrative adjudication.”).
67. See, e.g., FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
68. Id.
69. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
70. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (analyzing how to define
the word “interpreter”).
71. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (analyzing how to define
the phrase “law enforcement officer”).
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devolve into complicated legal quagmires as each party pushes
interpretations beneficial to their cause.72
At first, courts simply dodged parties’ attempts to convince them to
establish a standard for determining whether a defendant is “about to
violate” the law.73 One court even came to the tortured conclusion that a
defendant’s past violations (which all parties agreed had stopped) were
actually still ongoing, all so the court would not have to answer the
potentially precedent-setting question of how to evaluate whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.74
Eventually, however, courts began to coalesce around a standard
for determining whether a defendant is “about to violate” the law.75
Decades before Congress added Section 13(b) to the FTC Act, the
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. W.T. Grant Co. that injunctive
relief can be granted against any defendant who previously violated the
law so long as there is a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation.”76
Eventually, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to apply that
standard to a Section 13(b) case, ruling that its decision to grant
injunctive relief hinged on whether the defendant’s violations were
“likely to recur.”77 The Ninth Circuit did not seem to think that the
“likelihood of recurrence” standard was in tension with the plain text of
Section 13(b), which requires that violations be about to occur, not
merely likely to occur.78
Despite this potential friction, numerous courts across the country,
when faced with a defendant who had already violated the law and may
72. See also Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Kevin Aguirre,
Willfulness in a Post-Robare World: Evidence of Subjective Intent, Not Negligence
Conduct, is Needed to Show Willful Violations of Securities Laws, 25 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 501 (2020) (discussing judicial interpretation of the term “willful,” as
found in various provisions of the securities laws). See generally Taniguchi, 566 U.S.
560; Ali, 552 U.S. 214.
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Va. Homes Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 56-57 (D. Md.
1981), aff’d, 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981). This was the first case where the FTC sought
a permanent injunction under its Section 13(b) authority.
74. Id. at 56-58 (ruling that, although the defendant had stopped distributing the
unlawful warranty services, the fact that those warranties remained in public circulation
was sufficient to infer that violations were ongoing).
75. See, e.g., FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). This is known as
the “likelihood of recurrence” test.
77. FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1985).
78. See id.
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be “about to violate” the law again, have since adopted the “likelihood
of recurrence” test to determine whether to grant an injunction.79 Under
this test, violations are likely to recur if there is a “cognizable danger of
future violations.”80 These “cognizable danger” factors can include:
The degree of scienter, whether the conduct was an isolated instance
or recurrent, whether the defendants’ current occupations position
them to commit future violations, the degree of harm consumers
suffered from defendants’ unlawful conduct, and defendants’
recognition of their own culpability and the sincerity of their
assurances (if any) against future violations.81

Notably, some of those factors consider past conduct while others
consider potential indicators of future violations.82
Ostensibly, both types of factors must be present, since Section
13(b) does not allow injunctive relief based on past violations alone.83
Nonetheless, courts have allowed the FTC to seek injunctive relief

79. E.g., FTC v. USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV
19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020)
(granting a request for a permanent injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe
that the past conduct is likely to recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a
preliminary injunction because the court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable
danger of recurrent violations”); FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary
injunction because the court was “unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of
recurrent violation or some reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l
Urological Grp., No. 04-CV-3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June
24, 2005) (denying a request for an injunction after finding that the past violations were
not likely to recur); FTC v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(granting a request for a preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood
of future violations”); FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
80. FTC v. Citigroup, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (quoting FTC
v. Magui Publishers, No. 89–3818, 1991 WL 90895, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1991)).
81. Magui, 1991 WL 90895, at *15.
82. See id. Compare forward-looking factors such as “whether the defendant’s
current occupations position them to commit future violations” with backward-looking
factors such as “the degree of harm consumers suffered from defendants’ unlawful
conduct.” Id.
83. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (establishing that the FTC
can seek injunctive relief only when a defendant “is violating, or is about to violate” the
law).
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solely based on past violations.84 One court ruled that “the protracted
and systematic nature of [the defendant’s] past conduct and the degree
of harm consumers suffered from it would certainly permit an inference
of future misconduct and likelihood of recurrent bad acts.”85 Far from
even pretending to consider whether the defendant was “about to
violate” the law, the court ruled in favor of the FTC based solely on the
defendant’s “past conduct” and “degree of harm consumers suffered.”86
At least one other district court has taken a similar approach.87
In another case, a court stretched its application of the “likelihood
of recurrence” test to find that “an extensive history of violations does
beget an inference that future violations are likely to occur.”88 Under this
reasoning, for the FTC to satisfactorily show that a defendant is “about
to violate” the law, all the agency needs to do is show an “[e]xtensive
history of violations.”89 All told, these cases demonstrate how, despite
the text of Section 13(b), merely alleging past violations can be
sufficient for a court to infer that additional violations are about to
occur.90
The “likelihood of recurrence” standard is so entrenched that even
courts noting its potential incompatibility with the plain text of Section
13(b) use it anyway.91 For instance, one court, upon analyzing whether a
defendant was “about to violate” the law, noted that Section 13(b)
required it to “independently assess whether violations are imminent.”92
Yet, despite recognizing this imminency requirement, the court went
ahead and analyzed the claims under the “likelihood of recurrence”
84. See, e.g., FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No. 86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986).
85. Id. at *12.
86. Id.
87. See FTC v. Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (issuing a preliminary injunction after finding that the “alleged
violations . . . are likely to recur in the future given the past alleged violations of the
FTC Act” (emphasis added)).
88. FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3325, at *12–13
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id.; Shopper Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9; FTC v. ENGAGE-ACAR Servs., No. 86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17,
1986).
91. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
92. FTC v. Merch. Servs. Direct, No. 13-CV-0279, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114960, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
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test.93 The court did not explain why it recognized the necessity of one
standard (that violations must be “imminent”) but disregarded it entirely
and employed another (that violations need only be “likely to recur”).94
In sum, the “likelihood of recurrence” test is now the wellestablished principle used by courts when determining if a defendant
accused of past violations is “about to violate” again.95 Although the
“about to violate” language in Section 13(b) suggests that injunctive
relief should only be awarded if violations are “about” to occur, rather
than merely “likely” to occur, courts continue to use the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard.96 Additionally, some courts have awarded
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *4, *9–10.
See FTC v. USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV
19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020)
(granting a request for a permanent injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe
that the past conduct is likely to recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a
preliminary injunction because the court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable
danger of recurrent violations”); FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary
injunction because the court was “unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of
recurrent violation or some reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l
Urological Grp., No. 04-CV-3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June
24, 2005) (denying a request for an injunction after finding that the past violations were
not likely to recur); FTC v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(granting a request for a preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood
of future violations”); FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
96. See FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1985); FTC v.
USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187,
1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV 19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (granting a request for a permanent
injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe that the past conduct is likely to
recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a preliminary injunction because the
court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable danger of recurrent violations”);
FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary injunction because the court was
“unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of recurrent violation or some
reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., No. 04-CV3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2005) (denying a request
for an injunction after finding that the past violations were not likely to recur); FTC v.
Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a request for a
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injunctive relief based solely on past violations – a result that may stray
even further afield from the text of Section 13(b).97
III. THE CRUSADE AGAINST THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE”
STANDARD
For over three decades, the “likelihood of recurrence” test enjoyed
widespread acceptance by courts hearing Section 13(b) cases.98
Recently, however, there has been some significant pushback, especially
in the Third Circuit.99 This Part examines recent caselaw that imperils
the supremacy of the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.
A. SHIRE VIROPHARMA AND A NEW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Recently, the ordinary power of courts to issue permanent
injunctions has been threatened by a narrow judicial construction of the
“about to violate” language of Section 13(b).100 Shire ViroPharma, Inc.
(“Shire”)—a pharmaceutical company—produced a lucrative drug for
the treatment of a life-threatening intestinal infection.101 When a
competitor wanted to create a cheaper generic equivalent, Shire barraged
the FDA with dubious filings designed to delay the equivalent’s
approval.102 Five years after Shire lost that battle with the FDA, the FTC
sued, alleging that Shire had engaged in the anticompetitive practice of
“sham petitioning.”103 It invoked Section 13(b) to seek a permanent
injunction, claiming that although the sham petitioning process for that
preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood of future violations”);
FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866
(D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
97. See FTC v. Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2013); FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3325, at *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990); FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No. 863758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986).
98. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
99. See FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 156–159 (3d Cir. 2019).
100. Id.
101. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, FTC v. Shire
ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019).
102. Id. at 16-21.
103. Id. “Sham petitioning” is the practice of petitioning in bad faith before an
executive agency to ensure that the approval of a competitor’s product is delayed or
denied.
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drug had ceased, there was a danger that Shire could engage in similar
sham petitioning with another drug in the future.104 The FTC argued
they had satisfied the “about to violate” statutory language of Section
13(b) by showing a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of
recurrent future conduct.105
Shire prevailed in the district court.106 On appeal to the Third
Circuit, the court affirmed.107 In the opinion, Chief Judge Smith cited
Section 13(b) as constraining the courts’ customary power to issue
permanent injunctions, specifically noting that the “about to violate”
language of the statute plainly establishes a burden that is higher than
the “likelihood of recurrence” standard that the FTC put forth.108 The
panel’s tone—criticizing the FTC for “trot[ting] out” the argument that
remedial legislation should be liberally construed—suggests a hostility
to the FTC’s mission and little concern over Shire’s allegedly unlawful
campaign to protect its monopoly that burdened insurers and patients
with high costs for a vital medicine.109 As for establishing the “exact
confines” of the “about to violate” language, the Third Circuit left that
task “for another day.”110
B. THE VARIED RESPONSES TO SHIRE
The judicial response to Shire has not been uniform.111 One court
found Shire unpersuasive and ruled that the “about to violate” pleading
standard can be met, even if the illegal conduct has stopped, so long as
the FTC presents evidence that violations “could” resume.112 Compared
to Shire, this opinion presents an even looser interpretation of Section

104.
105.

Id. at 44-45.
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Opposition to Shire ViroPharma Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss at 8-10, FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, No. 17-cv-00131, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45727 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018).
106. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, No. 17-cv-00131, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45727, at
*19 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018).
107. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 2019).
108. Id. at 156, 159.
109. Id. at 158.
110. Id. at 160.
111. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
112. FTC ex rel. Yost v. Educare Ctr. Servs., 433 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1012–14 (W.D.
Tex. 2020). The court was particularly concerned that the defendant still maintained the
“intact infrastructure” used in the previous violations. Id.
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13(b), one where “could violate” is now synonymous with “about to
violate.”113
Additionally, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow Shire.114 This is hardly surprising considering that the Ninth
Circuit was the first to adopt the “likelihood of recurrence” test, which
remains the binding precedent in that circuit.115 Neither district court
ruling was appealed.116
Shire did convince a district court in the Eleventh Circuit to take a
fresh look at the “ordinary meaning” of Section 13(b)’s text; it
concluded that the “likelihood of recurrence” standard did not accurately
reflect the language of the statute.117 The court found that “about to
violate” “evokes imminence, as if the offending action could be resumed
with little delay.”118 By contrast, “[l]ikelihood of recurrence is less
immediate than ‘about to.’ It is similar to a preponderance, ‘more likely
than not.’”119 Despite abrogating the “likelihood of recurrence” standard,
the court did not assert any new framework for determining whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.120 It hinted that the FTC must
show that there is some “imminence” as to the violations but did not
establish any factors that courts could use to analyze whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.121 Regardless, this ruling,
coupled with Shire, suggests a potential for widespread change in how
courts interpret the “about to violate” requirement of Section 13(b)
cases.122

113. Compare FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 2019), with
Educare Ctr. Servs., 433 F. Supp. 3d at 1013-14.
114. See FTC v. Elec. Payment Sols. of Am., No. 17-02535, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157978, at *25-26 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2019); FTC v. Adept Mgmt., No. 16-cv-720, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96061, at *1 (D. Or. June 7, 2019).
115. FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. See FTC v. Elec. Payment Sols. of Am., No. 17-02535, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157978, at *25-26 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2019); FTC v. Adept Mgmt., No. 16-cv-720, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96061, at *1 (D. Or. June 7, 2019).
117. FTC v. Hornbeam Special Situations, No. 17-cv-3094, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
204340, at *12-13 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018). This ruling came before Shire was
affirmed by the Third Circuit.
118. Id. at *13.
119. Id. at *13-14.
120. Id. at *16.
121. Id. at *13-14.
122. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Section III introduced the current debate over whether the
“likelihood of recurrence” standard is the appropriate test to determine,
under Section 13(b), whether a defendant is about to violate the law.
This Section will argue that the “likelihood of recurrence” test should
not be used because it is unfaithful to the plain meaning and
congressional intent of Section 13(b).
A. THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE” TEST IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
PLAIN MEANING OF SECTION 13(B)’S TEXT
The plain meaning of the “about to violate” language of Section
13(b) demands a standard that is higher than the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard.123 Generally, when interpreting a statute, the first
step is to consider the plain meaning of the statutory text.124 If the text of
the statute has a plain, unambiguous meaning, that interpretation will
control absent extenuating factors.125
When courts evaluate the plain meaning of statutory text, some
factors that are often considered include the common usage or dictionary
definition of the word or phrase.126 In fact, courts often turn to dictionary
definitions when a word or phrase is undefined in a statute, as is the case
here.127 According to Merriam-Webster, a leading American English-

123.
124.

See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
See generally Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Taniguchi v.
Kan Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560 (2012); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214
(2008).
125. The bar for a court to disregard the plain, unambiguous meaning of a statute is
incredibly high. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (ruling
that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) must comply with the plain meaning of
particular language in the Endangered Species Act, even though doing so would force
the TVA to abandon a $100 million dam construction project that was already well
underway); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1985) (upholding a statutorilyset filing deadline of “prior to December 31st” because it was clear and unambiguous,
even though the agency all but admitted that it was a scrivener’s error and did not
intend to foreclose filings made on December 31st).
126. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731; Taniguchi, 566 U.S. 560; Ali, 552 U.S.
214.
127. E.g., Taniguchi, 556 U.S. at 566-70 (using dictionary definitions to
differentiate between an “interpreter” and a “translator”); Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (using the dictionary definition of “marketing” to
interpret a statute).
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language dictionary, the adverb “about” is defined as “almost” or “on
the verge of.”128 This definition is clear, well-established, commonly
recognized, and non-technical. As such, the ordinary meaning of “about
to” is clear and unambiguous.129
Returning to Merriam-Webster, the word “likely” is best defined as
“probably.”130 This clearly does not evoke the same level of imminence
or immediacy that is required under the plain meaning of Section
13(b)’s statutory text.131 Put simply, the phrases “likely to” and “about
to” are not interchangeable.132
As such, the “likelihood of recurrence” test inadvertently sets a
standard that is lower than what is required by the plain meaning of the
“about to violate” language of Section 13(b). Since the “likelihood of
recurrence” test does not comport with the plain meaning of the text,
courts should no longer use it when determining if a defendant is “about
to violate” the law. Instead, courts should undertake an analysis that
stays true to the plain meaning of the statutory text. Under such an
analysis, the phrase “about to violate” should be interpreted as it is
commonly understood. The examination should primarily consider
whether the defendant is on the verge of violating the law, and other
factors that help inform whether the violations are imminent, rather than
merely likely.
B. THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE” TEST IS UNFAITHFUL TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF SECTION 13(B)
Additionally, the congressional intent discerned from the statute’s
legislative history suggests that the “likelihood of recurrence” test is not
the appropriate standard for Section 13(b) cases.133 Generally, if the
128. About, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/about [https://perma.cc/8S5C-L4B8] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
129. See Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 187-89 (finding that the ordinary meaning of
a word in a statute is clear if there is a standard and well-accepted definition of that
word).
130. Likely, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/likley [https://perma.cc/C929-S4YF] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
131. See Taniguchi, 556 U.S. at 566-70 (ruling that a translator cannot be considered
an “interpreter” because it requires a different skillset and entails different job
functions).
132. See id.
133. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
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plain meaning of the text is clear, that interpretation will control, and the
statutory analysis will end there.134 Courts will look past the plain
meaning of the statutory text only if there is a severe and irreconcilable
conflict between the plain meaning of the text and the express intent of
the legislature.135
Here, the purpose and legislative history of Section 13(b) are not
irreconcilable with its plain meaning and, in fact, both actually support
an interpretation of the text grounded in its plain meaning.136 The
legislative history makes clear that Section 13(b) was designed to serve
two goals: to halt ongoing illegal conduct while the FTC is prosecuting
it and to halt pending conduct (typically mergers) that the FTC believes
would be illegal if it came to fruition.137 Essentially, it was intended to
be a “gap filler” that removed minor procedural hurdles and
supplemented the agency’s existing legal authority.138
Instead, far from being a mere gap filler, Section 13(b) now serves
as the conduit through which the FTC litigates almost all of its
enforcement actions.139 Of course, there is nothing wrong with the FTC
deciding to make the most of this valuable enforcement tool–one that
has become all the more salient as the FTC combats novel issues, such
as data privacy and information security.140 Instead, the pivotal issue is
that the widespread use of the “likelihood of recurrence” test has

134. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (ruling that the plain
meaning of the term “sex” must control, even though doing so expands the scope of the
statute well beyond what Congress had likely anticipated when they originally passed
the statute).
135. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 497-98 (2015) (refusing to adopt the plain
meaning of a word in the statute because doing so would doom the very program
created by the statute).
136. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
137. See discussion supra Section II.A.
138. See id.
139. See Calkins, supra note 66.
140. See Letter from Chairman Joseph J. Simons, Fed. Trade Comm’n Chairman,
Noah Joshua Phillips, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, Rohit Chopra, Fed. Trade Comm’n
Comm’r, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, and Christine S.
Wilson, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.adlawaccess.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/793/2020/10/2020.10.22-FTC-Letter-Section-13b-of-theFTC-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/57KE-L6RL] (noting that recent adverse caselaw
threatens the FTC’s ability to use its Section 13(b) authority to combat issues of data
security and privacy).
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enabled the agency to bring cases under Section 13(b) that were never
intended to be under the statute’s purview: cases where the illegal
conduct is neither ongoing nor imminent.141 Since the 1980s, the FTC
has used the “likelihood of recurrence” test to convince courts that an
allegation of past illegal conduct alone is sufficient to trigger its Section
13(b) authority to issue injunctive relief.142 This should not be allowed
to continue.
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
for Section 13(b) to give the FTC authority to seek injunctive relief for
violations that occurred solely in the past.143 The FTC already has an
avenue for litigating such cases: internal administrative adjudication.144
In those cases, where the violations occurred in the past and are no
longer ongoing, none of the important procedural and practical concerns
that spurred the adoption of Section 13(b) are present.145
In sum, the widespread acceptance of the “likelihood of recurrence”
test has caused injunctive relief to be awarded in cases that were never
intended to be covered by Section 13(b).146 As discussed in Section
IV.A., the plain meaning of the phrase “about to violate” demands that
the “likelihood of recurrence” test be discontinued, an argument that is
further supported by an examination of the congressional intent of
Section 13(b). For those reasons, courts should no longer use the
“likelihood of recurrence” test when determining if a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
See id.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
Section 13(b) was intended to solve the problem that the FTC had no way to
halt impending or ongoing illegal conduct while they prosecuted it. When the FTC
prosecutes conduct that is no longer ongoing, that problem is not present. See supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
146. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (mandating violations
must be either “ongoing” or “about” to occur); FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No.
86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986); FTC v.
Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 3,
2013) (issuing a preliminary injunction after finding that the “alleged violations . . . are
likely to recur in the future given the past alleged violations of the FTC Act” (emphasis
added)); FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3325, at *12–13
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1973, the FTC gained the authority to seek injunctive relief in
federal district court so long as it had reason to believe that a defendant
“is violating, or is about to violate” any of the laws enforced by the
agency.147 Since then, courts have predominantly used the “likelihood of
recurrence” test – which asks whether past violations are “likely to
recur” – to determine whether a defendant is “about to violate” the
law.148 Recently, however, the dominance of the “likelihood of
recurrence” test has come under scrutiny as courts question whether the
principle is more permissive in granting injunctive relief than the text of
Section 13(b) requires.149
An examination of the plain meaning and congressional intent,
which can be discerned through the legislative history, of Section 13(b)
shows that the statute does indeed set a bar for awarding injunctive relief
that is higher than the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.150 Namely,
Section 13(b) requires that future violations be imminent or impending –
not merely likely – for injunctive relief to be granted.151 Since the
“likelihood of recurrence” test does not comport with the plain meaning
or congressional intent of the statute, courts should no longer use it
when determining if a defendant is “about to violate” the law.152 Instead,
courts must undertake an analysis that is true to the text, an analysis that
must carefully and properly consider whether future violations are truly
about to occur.153
It is an immense power to be able to sue a party for violations that
are yet to occur. This resolution would appropriately restrain that power
by preventing the FTC from bringing cases against parties where their
violative conduct is only likely to recur.154 Importantly, this resolution
does not take away the FTC’s power to proactively sue for future
violations.155 For instance, the FTC can still sue a party if their violative
conduct becomes so imminent that they are truly about to violate the

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
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law.156 And, of course, the FTC can still sue a party once it is actively
violating the law.157 In this way, interpreting the statute under its plain
meaning and intent strikes a careful balance that prevents agency
overreach while ensuring that Section 13(b) remains a powerful tool for
protecting consumers.158
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